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Abstract Normally, privatisation is seen as beneﬁcial. In the case of Serbia, the results are
disappointing. This paper considers the failure of privatisation in Serbia – a latecomer in the
matter – where privatisation was partly a result of exogenous pressures. In Serbia, a sizeable
number of privatised ﬁrms were bought by bureaucrats and politicians and all ﬁrms were subjected
to a period of supervision. We argue that this process of privatisation was designed to allow rent-
seekers to conserve their privileges through asset stripping and that this explains the failure.
In order to do so, we perform empirical analysis of the determinants of liquidation, merger and
bankruptcy of privatised ﬁrms from 2002 to 2015. We construct a novel data set from primary
sources, free of the ‘survivorship bias’ and containing proxies for various types of owners, indirect
signs of asset stripping strategy and a broad range of controls. Our results indicate that ﬁrms
owned by politicians face signiﬁcantly higher risks of bankruptcy, especially after the end of
supervision.
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1 Introduction
Privatisation is dominantly aimed at increasing market eﬃciency. In transitions from planned
economies to market economies, it is a necessary pillar. The path to this goal is long and never
straightforward. Generally, the results are seen as beneﬁcial (see Megginson and Netter, 2001).
Nonetheless, there are instances where privatisation fails (Boettke, 1993, 2001, Schamis, 2002). For
a number of political reasons Serbia was one of the latecomers to step on this path. The impetus
for privatisation was partly domestic and partly imposed by foreign pressures, notably from
international organizations and the European community. The case of Serbia fully conﬁrms the
statement that privatisation is the most challenging part of transition (Hamm et al., 2012). Serbia
did not escape the privatisation-related failures and traps by learning from the experience of the
other transition economies. Privatisation processes generally fall prey—as in the case of Serbia—
to asset stripping (see Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 2004). A number of works (Gregurek, 2001, Gregoric,
2002, Cerovic and Mitrovic, 2007, Koman and Vasileva-Markovska, 2007, Koman et al., 2011,
2015) highlight the negative role of asset stripping during privatisation. Campos and Giovannoni
(2006) note that the propensity to strip assets is related to the power of the agent to inﬂuence the
framework of privatisation. In essence, the process of privatisation itself can be subjected to rent-
seeking (Krueger, 1974, Tullock, 2011) and lead to ”institutional stickiness”, whereby institutions
are so well embedded in the fabric of society that exogenous reforms would most likely fail to
generate the desired results (Boettke et al., 2008).
In this paper, we argue that failure in Serbia is explained by rent-seeking bureaucrats and
politicians who, feeling threatened by the impending reforms, co-opted the framing of the privati-
sation process in order to maintain their rent-extraction by allowing them to strip formerly state-
and socially-owned corporations of their assets. To make our case, we assemble a novel dataset
in order to reveal any eﬀects which could be attributed to asset stripping. The data collected
in order to perform the analysis has several dimensions: we combine the oﬃcial data from the
privatisation agency with the data on the background of the buyers and the events, court decision
and criminal records associated with the owners before and after the privatisation. The latter is
necessary to shed light on the behaviour of the new owners: whether they complied with the
law before and after the privatisation. This novel combination of data enables us to bring new
variables into the analysis, which were previously left out (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005, Gorod-
nichenko and Grygorenko, 2008, Sprenger, 2014). More precisely, we can divide ﬁrms by type of
owner. Overall, this allows us to use a strategy of survival analysis which is well-suited to our
case. Privatisation was progressive in the sense that the transfer of ownership was subjected to a
supervision period. Previous papers, where survival and duration models were applied, (Xu et al.,
2014, Sprenger, 2014), do not focus on the end of supervision. By diﬀerentiating owners, we can
see if the outcomes diﬀered for former bureaucrats and politicians (those who were insiders in the
process and could easily shape it). In addition, our strategy is not prone to ”survivorship bias”,
a measurement error related to including in the dataset only those ﬁrms, which have survived
through privatisation. In our dataset we cover the ﬁrms which failed, as well as the ﬁrms which
continue their existence. Our results show that, once supervision ended, ﬁrms owned by former
politicians and bureaucrats were subjected to asset stripping. While there were signiﬁcant failures
regardless of ownership, which is to be expected during transition as resources are reallocated,
the type of owner did not matter until the end of supervision at which point failures increased
dramatically for ﬁrms owned by former politicians and bureaucrats. Our strategy addresses and
resolves the points of Kikeri and Nellis (2004), who criticised the empirical research of the after-
maths of privatisation. Our ﬁndings suggest a new view on the role of the shaping of the process
of privatisation.
The paper is structured as follows: we start with the literature overview where we examine
well-established theories of privatisation, not limited to game-theoretic models but containing
empirical works as well; then we describe the empirical strategy and framework in order to ensure
a smooth transition to the section on our data sources and variable descriptions. Subsequently, we
present the results of the logistic regressions with estimated marginal eﬀects, conduct goodness-of-
ﬁt tests and additionally perform survival analysis. The interpretation as well as critical assertion
follows in the discussion. At the end, the concluding remarks summarise the key ﬁndings.
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2 Literature overview
Transitioning from a planned economy to a market economy is a radical but beneﬁcial process
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). Nonetheless, the process can fail to generate the desired outcomes
as a result of rent-seeking. Normally, rent-seeking is used to explain behavior aimed at acquir-
ing gain for oneself at the expense of society either through theft or government favors (Tullock,
2011, Krueger, 1974, Mueller, 2003, pp. 333-355). Large sections of the rent-seeking literature have
concentrated on rent-seeking destroying wealth through lobbying for restrictions to competition,
favorable regulatory barriers and privileged market status (Olson, 1982). However, rent-seeking
can also occur in the process of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. In the Encyclopedia
of Public Choice, Susan Rose-Ackerman (2003, p. 70) pointed out that ”unfortunately, privati-
sation does not always imply the creation of competitive markets” since the ”process of turning
over assets has itself been corrupted by collusion between powerful private and public interests”
(Rose-Ackerman, 2003, 70). In essence, this process of rent-seeking may allow ”bad” institutional
features to ”stick” (Boettke et al., 2008) and by the persistence of ambiguous property rights
people are distracted from engaging in productive activities (Gelb et al., 1998).
Individuals who have a vested interest in preserving their rents can either resist the reforms
or co-opt them. In planned economies, rent-seekers can be found embedded within the state
(Anderson and Boettke, 1997) when individuals are making decisions about the allocation rather
then markets, the rent-seeking activities are at their maximum (Gelb et al., 1998). Traditions,
norms as well as political culture and associated institutions favoured numerous rent-seeking
opportunities during the transition (Hillman and Ursprung, 2000). Through patronage, over-
market wages, prestige and reputation, politicians and bureaucrats can extract rents (Niskanen,
1971, Mueller, 2003, pp. 359-385). In essence, politicians and bureaucrats are no angel and they can
proceed to rent-extraction themselves or help others do so in exchange for a share of the spoils
(Tullock, 1972, 2003). Politicians and bureaucrats who previously supervised the state-owned
companies would have lost the stream of beneﬁts associated with their functions. However, it
is possible to co-opt the process by oﬀering inside connections for the owners of the privatised
ﬁrms. In fact, they could even acquire state assets and propose terms of sale that allow them to
extract their rents diﬀerently. Alternatively, they may be allowed to acquire liquidated assets at
below-market prices which would artiﬁcially increase proﬁtability. Such co-opting of the reform
process is a commonly used channel for explaining poor transition in formerly socialist economies.
Managers of formerly state-owned ﬁrms, and politicians, have succeeded in maintaining control of
large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital (Campos and Giovannoni, 2006). Thus, asset
stripping of state-owned ﬁrms turns out to be a common feature of privatisation.
Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2004) were two of the ﬁrst to model the preferences for asset stripping.
They proposed that uncertainty about the legal regime leads to asset stripping, and stripping
can give agents an interest in prolonging the existing legal framework (Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 2004).
Campos and Giovannoni (2006) developed an alternative model in which asset stripping is driven
by the interplay between the ﬁrm’s potential proﬁtability and its ability to inﬂuence law enforce-
ment. They found that relatively large ﬁrms, which use stripped assets, will be safe from law
enforcement due to the fact that the costs of government intervening against them (in terms
of inﬂuence, bribes or political support) are larger than the beneﬁts of reclaiming the stripped
assets. Additonally, they found that the ﬁrms with suﬃcient political power and intermediate
levels of potential proﬁtability will be the ones that choose to use stripped assets. There is further
evidence of such outcomes (e.g., Gregurek, 2001, Gregoric, 2002, Cerovic and Mitrovic, 2007, Ko-
man and Vasileva-Markovska, 2007, Koman et al., 2011). Koman et al. (2015) tested econometric
models of asset stripping in mass privatisation in Montenegro and found that, in the absence
of the rule of law, many ﬁrms that appear to have disappeared in the process of privatisation
were, in fact, expropriated by managers and individuals with political connections. Regarding
the characteristics of the ﬁrm that turn out to be signiﬁcant predictors of asset stripping, they
found that more productive ﬁrms and the smaller ﬁrms were also more likely to go bankrupt or
be liquidated. The absence of the rule of law, which enabled the asset stripping behavior of new
owners (politicians or politically connected and inﬂuential investors), signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the
success of privatisation in terms of number of ﬁrms that survived after privatisation. Megginson
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and Netter (2001) found that the identity of the new owners and managers was important in
determining post-privatisation performance.
The characteristics of the political system in the country are also found to be a signiﬁcant fac-
tor for the presence of asset stripping behavior. Grzymala-Busse (2003) found that where several
strong opposing parties competed for governance, the resulting electoral uncertainty led them to
constrain each other through formal regulations and informal practices. In contrast, where one
party dominated political competition, lax (or nonexistent) regulations allowed the informal ex-
traction of resources from state ﬁrms (asset stripping), the procurement of favorable privatisation
deals, and the accumulation of positions in public administration. Apart from that, several other
political factors turn to be the signiﬁcant predictors of success of privatisation. Bjørnskov and Po-
trafke (2011) found that market-oriented governments promoted the privatisation of small-scale
industries more than that of large-scale ones, and that the leftist governments stuck to public
ownership more strongly at the beginning of the privatisation than in the following period. Bor-
tolotti and Pinotti (2008) showed that privatisation is delayed in democracies characterised by a
larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules.
Bearing in mind these conclusions and ﬁndings from the related literature, we proceed to
formulating the empirical framework and strategy.
3 Empirical strategy
In the previous section we have noted the main ﬁndings of other authors. These can be summarised
as follows: The ﬁrst statement, consistent through many works (e.g., Koman et al., 2015, Hoﬀ
and Stiglitz, 2004, Lipton and Sachs, 1990, Boettke, 1993, 2001, Schamis, 2002, Rose-Ackerman,
2003), is that the institutional environment at the beginning of privatisation can create loopholes
allowing asset stripping strategies on the part of rent-seeking agents. The second statement, often
seen in the literature (e.g., Campos and Giovannoni, 2006), concerns the power of agents to
outmaneuver or exploit institutions and regulation.
Before we elaborate the working hypotheses, a brief description of the privatization process
and the related supervisory regulation is needed. When the price is paid in a lump sum, the Pri-
vatisation Agency continued to supervise the contractual provisions regarding investment plans,
social program and continuity of the dominant or core business activity for maximum of three
years after the signing of the contract. During this period, any violations of the Privatisation
Agency led to a sanctions ranging from a warning to termination of the agreement. Therefore
asset-stripping during this period entailed high costs and penalties. After expiration of this period,
the state could no longer inﬂuence strategic decision-making in individual ﬁrms. For instance, if
the ﬁrm is bought under the lump sum scheme with a single payment, then the maximum length
of the supervision period would be ﬁve years from the date of purchase (date of privatisation);
whereas, if the ﬁrm was bought with installment payments, the total duration of supervision
reaches ﬁve years, i.e. after the last installment is paid, but with a broader range of aspects to be
supervised (e.g., borrowing restrictions or restrictions on the sale (of part) of the property).
Our empirical strategy is based on identifying whether a speciﬁc type of new owner or a
speciﬁc ownership strategy impacts the risk of failure, or bankruptcy. The proxies for the variables,
presented below, will be explicitly mentioned in the subsequent section on the data; however, at
this point we would like to formulate the empirical model needed for our purposes. In a broad
sense, we estimate the determinants of failure, having speciﬁc hypotheses in mind. Distinguishing
between diﬀerent types of buyers is the ﬁrst step in our analysis:
Hypothesis 1 Speciﬁc types of owner may be related to higher risks of failure.
The ﬁrst hypothesis is related to speciﬁc characteristics of owners. Certain types of owners
may have diﬀerent discount factors1 than the others; or they may have a higher propensity or
1 Here we would like to note that there exist theories of endogenous time preferences that depend on wealth. Even
though some authors reject such a relationship (see Ogaki and Atkeson, 1997, for consumption decisions), it may
still be the case that wealth, among many other factors, determines the individual discount factor. Distinguishing
between the rich and the poor agents may be relevant for voucher privatisation; however, in our case the sample
consists of auctions and tenders. Our identification strategy is based on background information on the buyers: we
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ability to strip assets. An owner, who owns other ﬁrms in the sector, may purchase the ﬁrm
with an intention to close it and eliminate competition. The characteristics and preferences are
heterogeneous and with the help of our analysis we will be able to distinguish between the positive
or negative impacts of certain types of owner categories on the risk of failure.
Hypothesis 2 Speciﬁc ownership strategy, attributed to asset stripping, may be related to higher
risks of failure.
The second hypothesis is related to asset stripping types of strategies, chosen by the owners.
These may be related to a certain type of owner; however, they may represent an optimal outcome
of economic decision-making: e.g. compliance to the contract before the end of supervision and
after, or asset stripping after the end of supervision and similar strategies. Whereas the hypotheses
are focused on the buyer, we also control for the characteristics of the ﬁrm.
The empirical analysis is applied on the data, where we estimate the determinants of the
probability of a certain terminal outcome. In this case we require the assumption that our prob-
abilities are conditional on the type of the owner and on the choice of strategy. We start with
the formal deﬁnition of the outcome. The outcome j can be related to four mutually exclusive
categories: the ﬁrm is still active (0 or the base category); liquidated (1); merged (2) or bankrupt
(3). The last outcome can be identiﬁed as failure—the main focus of our paper.
Our data set, described in the next section, captures the terminal outcome of the decision-
making of the owners. Yet we can isolate the main eﬀects of interest and deﬁne the conditional
probability of an outcome j as in Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, pp. 261-262), bearing in mind
that g0(T, S,X) = 0 and the probabilities sum to unity:
P (y = j|T, S,X) =
egj(T,S,X)
1 +
∑3
h=1 e
gh(T,S,X)
for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (1)
The logit functions gj(T, S,X) for j 6= 0 can also take a linear form, which we later estimate:
gj(T, S,X) = ln
[P (y = j|T, S,X)
P (y = 0|T, S,X)
]
= βj0 + βjTT + βjsS + βjxX (2)
Where T is a dummy for type of owner, S is a vector of proxies for the asset stripping strategy
and X is controls, mainly related to the characteristics of the ﬁrm (e.g. size, price and required
investments and industry attribution). The controls would allow us to perform the robustness
checks by screening oﬀ the unrelated eﬀects, if such are present in the model.
Further we estimate the above-mentioned equation (2) and obtain the related coeﬃcients and
marginal probability eﬀects. Bearing in mind hypothesis 1, the coeﬃcient βjT and the related
marginal eﬀect, would capture the marginal change in the conditional probability of a certain
outcome if the agent has certain characteristic features. Let us focus on the probability of failure,
or bankruptcy (j = 3). If the marginal eﬀect of a proxy for an agent with a high propensity to strip
assets is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, β3T 6= 0, then hypothesis 1 would hold. Consequently, β3s
and the related marginal eﬀect, would capture the marginal change in the conditional probability
of failure under the choice of asset stripping strategy: e.g., if the eﬀect of the end of supervision
on the risk of bankruptcy is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, β3S 6= 0, hypothesis 2 would hold.
One should note that hypothesis 1 is not a necessary condition for hypothesis 2 because an asset
stripping strategy may still be chosen by agents with lower propensity to strip assets as an optimal
solution.
4 Data sources and description
Our sample consists of 1611 cases of privatised enterprises in Serbia in the period 2002-2015. The
implemented data architecture resembles survival data sets, since almost all of the explanatory
variables (with an exception to registered legal disputes after the privatization) were measured
isolate extremely influential tycoons, who already run multiple businesses and persons with political background.
We elaborate on this category of owners in the data section.
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prior to privatization or at the point when the contract was registered with the Privatisation
Agency. The data set encompasses the privatisation cases realised through auction and tender
procedures. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. In our regression model, the following
outcomes were in focus: liquidation, merger and bankruptcy. We are interested in the determinants
of these outcomes and probabilities related with them in order to understand the role of particular
agents in regard to diﬀerent ”destinies” of ﬁrms. While the merger and bankruptcy outcomes are
clear in their meaning, liquidation refers to the closure of a ﬁrm caused by the decision of its
owner and it is solely owner-initiated. As mentioned before, still active ﬁrms are marked as a
base category (0). Value 1 refers to the cases of liquidation. Value 2 is for merger, and 3 is for
bankruptcy of enterprises. In order to assign j outcome to each case i we have used the databases
of Serbian Business Registers Agency (APR), Bankruptcy Supervision Agency (ALSU) as well as
Privatisation Agency (AP).
Independent variables are explained following the way they have been structured in our empir-
ical strategy. To group T belong: tycoon, politician, disputes prior and buyer origin. The variable
tycoon refers to a speciﬁc type of new owner, i.e. to an economic agent who has accumulated
his wealth in the period prior to the privatisation and who has used the privatisation process to
continue his economic expansion. The fact that they had an opportunity to accumulate capital
prior to the privatisation was to some extent a unique characteristic in Serbia. In contrast to the
other former socialist countries, Serbia engaged in more intensive market reforms after a decade
of a transitional form of economic system between old socialist planned economy and certain
market institutions. In order to determine membership in the tycoon class of agent, we used a list
of the 300 hundred most inﬂuential people in Serbia, published in 2011 by daily newspaper Blic.
We strengthened this approach by consulting personal biographies of the agents in question. All
of the agents belonging to the group tycoon had signiﬁcant capital and business experience prior
to the privatisation process, i.e. prior to 2001. 7.52% of all buyers belonged to this category. Our
second variable, disputes prior, refers to whether the new owner had had oﬃcial legal disputes in
the period before the privatisation. Less than 1% of all enterprises were sold to this type of agent.
This variable was constructed by searching all available online sources for information about the
persons and ﬁrm owners engaged in the privatisation process. The politician variable was deter-
mined by asking whether the new owner had, or continues to have, a political engagement in one
of established political parties, or was an inﬂuential bureaucrat during the communist or Milo-
sevic era. This was established through online searches of biographies and newspapers.2 8.32%
of new owners were found to have a political background. Buyer origin was divided according to
the following markers: oﬀshore and ex-socialist. The oﬀshore designation is a dummy variable,
denoting whether the buyer’s origin is one of the oﬀshore zones as deﬁned by the classiﬁcation
given in the IMF Table of countries, territories and jurisdictions with oﬀshore ﬁnancial centers
IMF (2000). Investors coming from oﬀshore destinations played a rather minor role, participating
in around 2% of all privatisations. The ex-socialist designation indicates that the buyer came
from one of the former socialist countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine). 4% of all the cases fall into
this category. The data on the origin of the new owner was determined from the contracts.
For the S variable group, we have used disputes post, single payment, contract change and end
of supervision as categories. If the new buyer had legal disputes related to the privatised ﬁrm,
the marker of 1 was assigned. In 16% of privatised enterprises, buyers had, or are still having, ex
post legal disputes.3 Basically there were two options for the purchase of an enterprise: lump sum
or through installment payments, i.e. in six equal annual installments (with the ﬁrst installment
to be paid at initiation of the agreement). The lump sum mode is coded in single payment as 1.
The majority of investors showed a preference for the second option, accounting for 65% of all
sales. The percentage is even higher, if we exclude the foreign investors who had only the lump
2 The sources (Newspapers, Weekly Magazines, Television and Radio Stations) used to identify persons with
political background include but are not limited to: Politika, Blic, Danas, NIN, Novosti, Kurir, Vesti, Vreme, Press,
Glas Javnosti, B92, Radio-Television of Serbia, Radio-Television of Vojvodina.
3 We considered only legal disputes, while the list of other kinds of disputes is much broader, including complaints
involving syndicates or minority shareholders, to be found in newspapers and other Internet sources, but without
legal process behind them prior to the end of 2015.
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sum option at their disposal, because purchase by installment payment was reserved for domestic
residents by the Law on Privatisation.4
Whether ex post contract change occurred or not is recorded by the variable contract change.
This happened in 21% of cases. Evidence for this was gathered by evaluation of every single
contract. If the contract was supplemented by additional appendices stipulating changes in original
contractual provisions, we counted that as a contract change. The reasons for contract change
were very diverse.5
The dummy variable end of supervision refers to the period of one year between 60 and 72
months after privatisation of the given ﬁrm. If the failure happened within this time, the variable
takes the value 1, and otherwise is 0. The background for this variable is to be found in the
laws, bylaws and contractual provisions concerning the period in which the Privatisation Agency
had the instruments at its disposal to control and supervise the diverse business aspects of the
privatised enterprise. As we will see presently, this variable turns out to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of the risk of failure.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd
Liquidation 0.0317 0.1753
Merger 0.046 0.2096
Bankruptcy 0.4066 0.4914
Tycoon 0.0752 0.2637
Politician 0.0832 0.2762
Disputes prior 0.0074 0.086
Disputes post 0.1564 0.3634
Single payment 0.3547 0.4786
Contract change 0.2067 0.4051
LN PINV 16.83 1.94
Too big to fail 0.1273 0.3334
End of supervision 0.0584 0.2345
Distance 131.92 97.54
Ex-Socialist 0.0403 0.1968
Offshore 0.0211 0.1438
Mining and Construction 0.1649 0.3712
Manufacturing 0.3242 0.4682
N 1611
The category X encompasses control variables too big to fail, distance, LN PINV, mining and
construction, and manufacturing. Around 13% of all enterprises qualify as too big to fail. This
variable includes enterprises with more than 250 employees. We determined whether or not this
criterion was satisﬁed using the EU classiﬁcation of micro, small, medium and large enterprises
according to the number of employees EU (2015). The data on the number of employees for every
enterprise are given on the Privatisation Agency website, under the section enterprise proﬁle.
The variable distance measured how far the enterprise was from the capital. We tried to capture
the regional eﬀects of enterprise location by assuming that greater distance was correlated with
poorer institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as with poorer market conditions and
access to them. Logarithmic values of price and investments are captured by variable ln price
and investments (LN PINV ). The data originate from the contracts and are constructed as a
sum of price and investment value. Both values are summed together and indicate the complete
direct ﬁnancial liability at purchase. The variables mining and construction and manufacturing
refer to the industrial sector to which the enterprise belongs. We have used the North American
Classiﬁcation System (NAISC) to categorise enterprises. In mining and construction we have
4 Article 31 of the Regulation on sale of capital and property in auctions (National Assembly of Serbia, 2001),
conferred an exclusive right to installment buying on natural persons.
5 We have identified the following reasons for contract changes: change of owner (contract of assignment, change
of the stakes among the owners in the case of consortium or the change of members of consortium), payment of the
full price before the contractually determined term, corrections of price or other elements (which were incorrectly
or incompletely stipulated in the original contract), delay in installments, change in dominant business activity (or
addition of new activities to the dominant one), change of the legal form of the subject of the privatisation (from
stock company to the limited liability form), or changes in originally negotiated investment dynamics.
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aggregated mining and construction companies (codes 21 and 23 in NAISC). In manufacturing
we include only manufacturing ﬁrms (codes 31-33). 32% of the companies in our sample are in
manufacturing, while 16% are in mining and construction.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
Table 2 presents the results of our basic multinomial model. The marginal eﬀects (ME) represent
the slope of the probability function and are calculated as average partial eﬀects (see Wooldridge,
2002, pp. 470-471) for all speciﬁcations. We run a multinomial logit with three dependent variables
resembling the related outcome: liquidation, merger and bankruptcy. The explanatory variables
are the same, only the outcome variable has three categories. In Column 2 we report the MEs for
the probability of liquidation; Column 4 contains MEs for the probability of merger; in Column
6 we report the MEs for the estimated risk of bankruptcy. The latter equation is crucial in
identifying the determinants6 of failure of the privatised ﬁrms and potentially, identifying asset
stripping. In addition to estimating the model with robust standard errors, we perform estimation
with bootstrapped standard errors (see Tables 6 and 7 in the appendix).7
In Column 2 the evidence shows that the type of agent, tycoon, as well as politician, is not
signiﬁcant for liquidation. The only signiﬁcant eﬀects are related to the initial purchase costs
variable and the end of supervision. LN PINV is inversely related to the risk of liquidation.
However, the eﬀect is rather small: a 1% increase in initial costs yields a 0.777% decrease in the
risk of liquidation. End of supervision decreases the risk of liquidation by 2.18% - the latter eﬀect
is weak and vanished after bootstrapping the errors. The estimations with bootstrapped standard
errors indicate that only initial investments were signiﬁcant.
Explaining the determinants of merger yields more signiﬁcant eﬀects. In Column 4 we observe
that the type of agent may inﬂuence the probability of mergers: the variable tycoon is signiﬁcant at
all levels and the positive eﬀect is around 10.7%. Owners with political background are negatively
related to the probability of merger, however this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant at 5% level and it was
not found after bootstrapping the errors. Disputes prior decrease the probability of merger by
4.64%. The status of a large ﬁrm, too big to fail, decreases the probability of a merger: the ME is
-3.37%. The end of supervision decreases the probability of a merger by 4.86%. This means that
in the ﬁrst year after the end of supervision mergers are unlikely. Therefore the type of agent as
well as the type of strategy are good predictors for the probability of merger. After bootstrapping
the standard errors (see Table 6) the same eﬀects were signiﬁcant, with an exception to too big
to fail.
Column 6 contains the most interesting results: both types of both agent are signiﬁcant de-
terminants of the risk of bankruptcy. The status of tycoon is associated with a decrease in the
risk of bankruptcy: the eﬀect is -8.78%; whereas the variable politician is related to an increase
in this risk by 11.5%. The variable disputes post also increases the risk of failure by 14.3%. Con-
tract adjustments, captured by the variable contract change, are inversely related to the risk of
bankruptcy: the eﬀect is around -6.28%. The initial privatisation costs, LN PINV, exhibit an
inverse relation as well: the eﬀect is -2.78%. Large enterprises tend to face higher risks: the ME
of too big to fail is 17.3%. The largest eﬀect can be seen for the end of supervision: during the
ﬁrst year after the end of supervision, the risk of failure increases by 53.4%. The distance eﬀect
is signiﬁcant as well: with every 100 kilometers away from Belgrade, the risk increases by roughly
6.41%. With an exception to the tycoon variable, with the bootstrapped standard errors we ﬁnd
the same eﬀects to be signiﬁcant (see Table 6).
6 One has to note that not all covariates may necessarily imply causality and there is room for discussion, which
we elaborate in the next section.
7 For bootstrapping the errors we use 200 replications, which is sufficient according to Efron and Tibshirani
(1994, pp. 14-15). The settings for the seed of the pseudo-random number generator ensure comparability between
the baseline and expanded specifications. Nevertheless, we reports the latter estimates in the appendix: due to
potential sensitivity of the values of standard errors to bootstrapping parameters, they should be interpreted with
caution. These bootstrapped standard errors merely serve as a check of whether the variables of interest remain
significant with the bootstrapped standard errors.
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The baseline speciﬁcation passes the generalized Hosmer-Lemeshow quantile test with ten
groups based on Fagerland et al. (2008) with an overall p-value of 0.688. Same applies to the
estimations with the bootstrapped standard errors. Let us add additional control variables and
check whether certain eﬀects are still signiﬁcant.
5.2 Robustness check
The results for the expanded model are controlled for the origin of the buyer and the industry
attribution. In Column 8 we report MEs for liquidation; whereas in Columns 10 and 12 the MEs
for merger and bankruptcy are displayed.
In Column 8 we observe that the eﬀect of initial costs and investments is robust after control-
ling for industry attribution and origin of the buyer: the eﬀect is -0.855%. The oﬀshore origin of
the buyer decreases the probability of liquidation by 3.2%. Attribution to mining and construction
seems to be inversely related to the probability of liquidation. After bootstrapping the errors the
the latter eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant; however, oﬀshore origin and initial investments remain
signiﬁcant (see Table 7).
The tycoon status is a positive determinant for merger in Column 10 and increases the prob-
ability by 11.4%; whereas political background is associated with a decrease in the probability
of merger by 2.72%, although the eﬀect vanishes after bootstrapping the errors. Disputes prior
tend to decrease the probability of merger by 4.67%. Large ﬁrms also have a lower probability
of merger: the eﬀect of too big to fail is -3.32%. During the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst year after the end of
supervision the probability of merger decreases by 4.86%. The ex-Socialist origin of the owner is
associated with an decrease of the probability of merger by roughly 3.14%. Except the for the
latter buyers’ origin eﬀect, all other eﬀects remain signiﬁcant after bootstrapping the errors.
Column 12 contains the most important ﬁndings: the risk of bankruptcy is inversely related to
tycoon status (-9.19%), and a political background increases the risk by around 11.7%. Disputes
post are also robust, and the eﬀect reaches 15.2%. Contract adjustments and initial costs are
inversely related to the risk of bankruptcy: the eﬀects are -5.72% and -2.71% respectively. An
increase in distance from Belgrade of 100 kilometers is associated with an increase in bankruptcy
risk of 5.46%. Firms from the manufacturing, and mining and construction industries faced higher
risks as well: 14.8% and 9.14% increases respectively. The too big to fail status is related to an
increase in the risk of bankruptcy by 14.9%. The eﬀect of the end of supervision has the largest
magnitude and is robust: during the ﬁrst year after the end of supervision the risk of bankruptcy
increases by 52.8%. In addition to this, we perform survival analysis to test the role of the end
of supervision from a diﬀerent perspective. All of the above-mentioned eﬀects remain signiﬁcant
after bootstrapping the errors (see Table 7).
The generalized Hosmer-Lemeshow quantile test results for the expanded speciﬁcation have
the p-value of 0.671 overall and all groups seem to perform well (see Table 3). Same applies to
the estimation with the bootstrapped errors.
In all estimations of the risk of bankruptcy, including the ones with bootstrapped errors,
political background and the end of supervision remained signiﬁcant. Since we have mentioned
that one of the largest eﬀects is related to the end of supervision, it is essential to consider time
eﬀects related to bankruptcy in detail. Using speciﬁc tools from the survival analysis we can
consider the distribution of failures in time, starting from the moment of privatisation of each
ﬁrm. This approach is implemented in the next section.
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Table 2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables liquidation ME merger ME bankruptcy ME
Tycoon 0.359 0.0108 1.397*** 0.107*** -0.232 -0.0878*
(0.705) (0.0271) (0.366) (0.0399) (0.252) (0.0464)
Politician 0.303 0.00288 -0.546 -0.0252* 0.510** 0.115**
(0.551) (0.0175) (0.546) (0.0131) (0.215) (0.0472)
Disputes prior 1.091 0.0858 -13.99*** -0.0464*** -0.918 -0.176
(1.186) (0.113) (0.460) (0.00525) (0.897) (0.132)
Disputes post 0.104 -0.00607 0.228 -0.00257 0.675*** 0.143***
(0.487) (0.0124) (0.388) (0.0156) (0.168) (0.0363)
Single payment -0.191 -0.00614 0.402 0.0184 -0.00362 -0.00525
(0.322) (0.00891) (0.251) (0.0116) (0.126) (0.0259)
Contract change 0.264 0.0131 -0.170 -0.00316 -0.298** -0.0628**
(0.378) (0.0142) (0.332) (0.0135) (0.149) (0.0296)
LN PINV -0.325*** -0.00777*** -0.0724 -0.000119 -0.156*** -0.0278***
(0.0756) (0.00237) (0.0743) (0.00307) (0.0356) (0.00711)
Too big to fail -0.387 -0.0161 -0.816* -0.0337*** 0.722*** 0.173***
(0.788) (0.0133) (0.482) (0.0101) (0.198) (0.0423)
End of supervision 0.913 -0.0218* -12.03*** -0.0486*** 2.956*** 0.534***
(1.062) (0.0117) (0.442) (0.00551) (0.426) (0.0339)
Distance 0.00117 -5.12e-06 0.00110 -5.48e-06 0.00318*** 0.000641***
(0.00133) (3.86e-05) (0.00111) (4.56e-05) (0.000601) (0.000118)
Constant 2.341** -1.542 1.656***
(1.171) (1.230) (0.587)
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Goodness-of-fit
Generalized Hosmer-Lemeshow quantile test, group P value
Group Table 2 Table 4
1 0.3199 0.3002
2 0.3670 0.3479
3 0.3972 0.3847
4 0.4304 0.4223
5 0.4583 0.4613
6 0.4842 0.4994
7 0.5182 0.5395
8 0.5749 0.5903
9 0.6652 0.6898
10 0.9833 0.9866
Overall 0.688 0.671
Observations 1586 1577
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Table 4: Robustness check: industry attribution and buyer origin
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables liquidation ME merger ME bankruptcy ME
Tycoon 0.358 0.0107 1.454*** 0.114*** -0.251 -0.0919**
(0.714) (0.0274) (0.368) (0.0409) (0.250) (0.0450)
Politician 0.344 0.00409 -0.625 -0.0272** 0.529** 0.117**
(0.550) (0.0180) (0.564) (0.0128) (0.219) (0.0471)
Disputes prior 1.270 0.101 -13.94*** -0.0467*** -0.822 -0.164
(1.162) (0.121) (0.468) (0.00527) (0.934) (0.142)
Disputes post 0.132 -0.00598 0.218 -0.00382 0.730*** 0.152***
(0.490) (0.0125) (0.394) (0.0156) (0.171) (0.0361)
Single payment -0.295 -0.00837 0.375 0.0182 -0.0593 -0.0150
(0.329) (0.00891) (0.266) (0.0123) (0.131) (0.0262)
Contract change 0.290 0.0137 -0.151 -0.00282 -0.273* -0.0572*
(0.385) (0.0145) (0.327) (0.0133) (0.151) (0.0295)
LN PINV -0.351*** -0.00855*** -0.0833 -0.000563 -0.157*** -0.0271***
(0.0755) (0.00240) (0.0765) (0.00316) (0.0372) (0.00732)
Too big to fail -0.447 -0.0162 -0.843* -0.0332*** 0.622*** 0.149***
(0.782) (0.0132) (0.498) (0.0107) (0.203) (0.0429)
End of supervision 0.833 -0.0224* -11.95*** -0.0486*** 2.940*** 0.528***
(1.063) (0.0115) (0.442) (0.00549) (0.430) (0.0352)
Distance 0.00110 -1.73e-06 0.000939 -5.08e-06 0.00277*** 0.000546***
(0.00134) (3.90e-05) (0.00115) (4.74e-05) (0.000616) (0.000120)
Ex-Socialist 1.090* 0.0571 -1.095 -0.0314* -0.0623 -0.0239
(0.651) (0.0475) (1.111) (0.0181) (0.308) (0.0619)
Offshore -12.98*** -0.0320*** 0.948 0.0648 -0.0424 -0.0195
(0.380) (0.00442) (0.696) (0.0628) (0.402) (0.0808)
Mining and Construction -0.549 -0.0171* -0.430 -0.0204 0.375** 0.0914***
(0.475) (0.00943) (0.418) (0.0125) (0.159) (0.0333)
Manufacturing 0.220 -0.00267 0.0961 -0.00804 0.712*** 0.148***
(0.336) (0.00967) (0.284) (0.0112) (0.132) (0.0273)
Constant 2.790** -1.292 1.466**
(1.179) (1.281) (0.621)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.3 Survival analysis
Special attention should be drawn to the eﬀect of supervision, which we attempted to capture
with the variable end of supervision, which represents a control for the ﬁrst year after the end
of supervision, i.e. the 6th year. In terms of the survival analysis it is important to note that we
identify bankruptcy (j = 3) as failure.8
It follows from both tables that the ﬁrst year after the maximum length of supervision is
associated with an increase in the risk of bankruptcy by roughly 53%, which is the change in
probability for the given eﬀect (Tables 2 and 4). However, this requires further investigation, which
can be carried out by means of the survival analysis: this will allow us to derive the probability
of failure at a given month after the ﬁrm was privatised. In order to apply the survival analysis
we had to censor the survival sample from the very beginning of the data to the end of 2015.
In Figures 1 and 2 we display the estimated failure rates using the Kaplan-Meier estimator (see
Kaplan and Meier, 1958) and point-wise conﬁdence intervals based on Cefalu (2011). Figure 2
shows the failure rate per each month for two groups: owners with political background, denoted
in our tables by the variable politician, and all other buyers. Since the longest supervision span is
related to the installment payment mode, in Figure 2 we isolate the failure estimates for buyers
with political background who purchased the ﬁrms by installments. In order to verify the equality
of the hazard functions for the politicians and other buyers, we perform four additional statistical
tests (see Table 5).
Figure 1 suggests that starting from the longest supervision benchmark the failure rate for
the ﬁrms under ownership of buyers with political background is higher. After the benchmark
we observe a prominent increase in the failure rates. An even more distinctive pattern can be
seen in Figure 2, for the politicians who used the installment mode to purchase the ﬁrms. In the
latter case the failure rates prior to the end of the supervision are almost the same as the failure
rates for the ﬁrms owned by other types of buyers; however, right after the end of supervision,
we observe an increase in failure rates. In the aftermath, the estimates suggest that the this type
of owner is associated with distinctively higher failure rates. In Table 5 we report the test results
on the equality of the hazard functions for politicians against other owners: all of the tests reject
the null hypothesis of equality. Therefore, the diﬀerence in failure rates is statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, from Table 5, panel (B), it follows that before the end of supervision the equality
of the hazard functions can not be rejected. From Table 5, panel (C), we can also conclude that
after the end of supervision the hazard functions diverge from each other signiﬁcantly. Therefore,
the end of supervision accounts for the most of the divergence between the hazard functions for
ﬁrms purchased by persons with political background and other types of owners. It may be an
additional hint that the asset stripping behaviour manifests itself only after the supervision has
ended.
Table 5: Testing for the equality of hazard functions before and after the end of supervision
A. Testing the equality for the overall function χ2 P value
Peto and Peto (1972) and Prentice (1978) test 9.83 0.0017
Generalised Wilcoxon test (see Gehan, 1965, Breslow, 1970) 8.51 0.0035
Tarone-Ware test (see Tarone and Ware, 1977) 10.25 0.0014
B. Testing the equality during supervision (<60 months)
Peto and Peto (1972) and Prentice (1978) test 0.07 0.7951
Generalised Wilcoxon test (see Gehan, 1965, Breslow, 1970) 0.08 0.7782
Tarone-Ware test (see Tarone and Ware, 1977) 0.21 0.6459
C. Testing the equality after supervision ( ≥ 60 months)
Peto and Peto (1972) and Prentice (1978) test 12.55 0.0004
Generalised Wilcoxon test (see Gehan, 1965, Breslow, 1970) 10.74 0.0010
Tarone-Ware test (see Tarone and Ware, 1977) 12.32 0.0004
Note: the H0 of equality of hazard functions for owners with
political background against other owners is assumed
8 Other categories such as merger and liquidation are disregarded since after mergers the firms most likely
continue to exist, but in a different form, and liquidation can not be directly attributed to failure. In case of
liquidation a firm does not have any problems in meeting its business related obligations and the reasons for
liquidating the firm are intrinsic.
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Fig. 1: Failure rates with end of 2015 censoring (dotted line denotes maximum length of supervision after the firm
was privatised)
Fig. 2: Failure rates with end of 2015 censoring (dotted line denotes maximum length of supervision after the firm
was privatised)
The last remark to be made is related to the macroeconomic conditions during the time of
privatisation and registration of failures. As it follows from the reports of the Statistical Oﬃce
of the Republic of Serbia, the ﬁrst distinctive recession during our sampling period is observed
during the third quarter of 2008 until the ﬁrst quarter of 2010 (see Quarterly National Accounts
Division, 2011, p. 1). The second recession occurred during 2012 (see Quarterly National Accounts
Division, 2013, pp. 1-2). There are no signs of the impact of either recession on Figures 1 and 2:
if these were present, we would see level shifts aﬀecting both groups; however, this is not the case
and both functions are relatively smooth. It is also not plausible to assume that a recession would
hit only ﬁrms owned by politicians, or particularly politicians who used installment schemes.
Therefore, the sharp increase of failure rates for ﬁrms owned by politicians after the end of the
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maximum supervision time span most likely has an institutional, rather than macroeconomic,
cause.
Our empirical ﬁndings provide evidence in the support of hypotheses 1 and 2: the speciﬁc
types of buyer, in our case, inﬂuential politicians and bureaucrats, as well as the proxies for asset
stripping strategies, are signiﬁcant. We have also supported our ﬁndings by means of survival
analysis. Still, we need to interpret these results and provide critical assertions comparing our
ﬁndings to those of other authors.
6 Discussion
The overall estimation results reported in all our tables suggest that the probability of failure of
the enterprise is signiﬁcantly related to the speciﬁc type of new owner, i.e whether the owner can
be categorised as a politician.
Contrary to the explanations that rich agents (as captured by tycoons in our case) are able
to weaken the enforcement of law and the security of property rights (Roland, 2001, Sonin,
1999, Polishchuk, 1999), or that they use their inﬂuence to outmaneuver regulation (Campos and
Giovannoni, 2006), we found that rich agents were not prone to follow opportunistic strategies
towards asset stripping. Moreover, the probability of bankruptcy was inversely related to tycoon
status. Nevertheless, they did use the privatisation process to grow in market segments in which
they already had established businesses, which is captured in the regression for the variable
merger. Our ﬁndings, although not based on proﬁtability or some other measure of eﬃciency
of privatised enterprises, are in line with the argumentation of some other studies, which assert
that the tycoons or oligarchs were able to improve the eﬃciency of enterprises (see Guriev and
Rachinsky, 2005, Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko, 2008).9
In comparison, bureaucrats and former politicians behaved very diﬀerently. They had a greater
propensity to declare bankruptcy and survival analysis suggests that they tended to do so only
after the supervision period had ended. As we can see from Figures 1 and 2, the failure rates
during the maximum length of supervision are relatively low overall. What is important is what
happened after the end of supervision. The expiration of the longest supervision period, in our
case 60 months, can be clearly seen as a cut-oﬀ, after which a steep rise of failure of the ﬁrms
owned by the politicians can be observed. This reﬂects opportunistic strategies and asset stripping
tendencies which materialised right after the end of supervision period. The hazard function for
other types of buyers does not exhibit such jumps. The role of control and supervision in post-
privatisation was meant to insure the successful transition to a privately-owned economy, yet the
greater failure rate for politicians only after supervision ends suggests that as soon as they felt
they could extract their rent, the politicians did so. It is a strong conﬁrmation of the claim that
the interplay between government and rent seeking in transition economies ”has often been more
personal” (see Gelb et al., 1998, p.31) and that the politicians are not behaving benevolently
(Hillman, 1998). It also echoes results like those regarding transition in the Czech Republic
(Stringham and Clark, 2008).
According to (Bjørnskov and Potrafke, 2011), in transition countries right-wing governments
promoted more intensive privatisation policies for small and medium size enterprises, while for the
large industries the privatisation ideology was less signiﬁcant. In the case of Serbian privatisation,
according to the same set of indicators (EBRD), privatisations were less ideologically dependant.
After having passed a Law on Privatisation in 2001, there were several election cycles (2003,
2007, 2008, 2012, 2014), during which parties from diﬀerent parts of the political spectrum were
dominating government. After an initial rise in privatisation indexes, the respective indicators
of privatisation were constant after 2005/2006. For example, after an election in 2007, when
the government was led by a prime minister from the conservative Democratic Party of Serbia
(Demokratska Stranka Srbije), the indicators were the same as when the left-liberal Democratic
9 One has to distinguish between the analysis of failure or failure rates for all firms privatised and the analysis of
the performance of the surviving firms. In the latter case one may be confronted with the ”survivorship bias”, the
phenomenon of a measurement error, mentioned in the critique of Kikeri and Nellis (2004). Our empirical strategy
covers the broadest sample of firms, including the ones which failed to survive, i.e. which were in the meantime
closed or are under bankruptcy procedure.
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Party (Demokratska Stranka) in coalition with the Socialist Party (Socijalisticka Partija Srbije
- communist successor) came into power in 2008. One should also note that trade liberalization
during privatisation (see Hillman and Ursprung, 1996) created additional pressure to improve
competitiveness. This created an ideological environment favorable to privatisation. One may
assume that the failures in doing business made by owners with political background, whether
bureaucrats or politicians, can be attributed to their incompetence. While it is a reasonable
assertion, it seems hard to sustain it facing the fact that failure rates are roughly similar for all
groups until the end of supervision. We do not believe that incompetence simply appears once
restraints are removed. In addition, there is very little to sustain the contention that politicians
were inept administrators. On a de jure basis, the selection and advancement of individuals for
public service ”is to be pledged on professional qualiﬁcations, knowledge and skills” and that only
the ”best candidates” should be considered (Articles 9. and 10. Law on Civil Servants and National
Assembly of Serbia, 2005). On a de facto basis, higher wages in the public sector than in the private
sector attract a wide selection of candidates which allows a certain form of ”cream-skimming”
(Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011). Another noteworthy fact is that the median age of ﬁrm buyers
in our sample is 57 years old: for tycoons it is 58 and for politicians it is 57. This similarity in
characteristics militates against the belief of fundamental diﬀerences in abilities. Finally, being
a former politician or bureaucrats may actually a marketable skill. Political connections are
actually valuable business skills which would de facto give a competitive edge to politicians and
bureaucrats. The ability to ”game the system” allows them to obtain licences more easily in
order to expand their businesses (see Hillman, 1998, p. 358). Gelb et al. (1998, p. 25) state that
politicians may obtain better contracting terms by dealing with former government colleagues.
Taken together, the sum of these facts suggests that they are not incompetent, they are merely
continuing their rent extraction by other means.
Politicians and bureaucrats who were previously extracting rent through state-owned enter-
prises may have felt that the commitment to privatisation was credible. Thus, they shifted gears
and co-opted the privatisation process. On top of waiting for supervision to end before they folded
the privatised ﬁrms, they also established favorable terms of privatisation. For example, the vari-
able single payment, which refers to the payment method (lump sum or installments), should be
observed as an additional regulation tool, providing diﬀerent opportunities for diﬀerent buyers
depending on their residence. This ﬁts with the ﬁndings of several other studies, which state that
most governments favored domestic over foreign investors (Megginson and Netter, 2001, Jones
et al., 1999, Bortolotti et al., 2004). Serbia is no exception to this, although we did not observe
that it had any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the outcome of privatisation. The consequence was not
only that the domestic buyers were favored, but it also allowed a larger number of agents without
real economic power to participate in privatisation takeovers. The competitive bidding process
was designed to favor broad participation, notably by allowing domestic buyers without enough
capital to acquire ﬁrms by installment. On the other hand, this would also have allowed politi-
cians and bureaucrats to acquire ﬁrms at a discount. In many cases, the most valuable property
of the enterprise was land and its location, but it was omitted from the enterprise valuation be-
cause the state-owned enterprise had only the right to use the land, without other clear property
rights on it. Though considered appropriate at the beginning of the transition, this deﬁciency
was eventually removed and land was acquired at very low cost relative to market value. Another
deﬁciency consisted in the way enterprises were valued. The consulting ﬁrms used book values
of equipment and real estate, and not market values. The divergence between those two was
sometimes remarkably high and the state revenues in consequence signiﬁcantly lower (see more
Pavlovic, 2016).
It is also worth noting that the privatisation process in Serbia was characterised by short
agency chains instead of the commonly-used voucher approach (Ellerman, 2003). This kind of
regulation framework probably helped to avoid problems with the implementation of privatisa-
tion due to diversiﬁed interests,10 but it contained weaknesses of another kind. Such institutional
designs are prone to be captured by interest groups and strongly controlled by politicians. The
10 Contrary to experiences in some other former communist countries, such as Bulgaria (Bogetic and Hillman,
1995), workers and managers could not generally hamper the privatisation implementation.
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weak institutional environment,11 combined with the wide discretionary power of the privati-
sation agency and the government through short agency chains, produced a situation in which
abuses were very probable. According to the Report of the Anti-Corruption Council (see Anti-
Corruption Agency, 2015), the discretionary power of the director of the privatisation agency
enabled arbitrary delays in meeting the contractual provisions.12
The last interesting eﬀect relates to the greater risks of bankruptcy by ﬁrms with more than
250 employees. One could attribute this eﬀect to moral hazard: new owners know about strategic
importance of the ﬁrms and strip assets, anticipating that the state will perform a bail out. Indeed,
the framework for bail outs was present; however, such interventions were often performed on a
case by case basis. In the aftermath, some of the ﬁrms got the needed help and survived, the others
did not. For example, the paper factory ”Božo Tomic” in Čacak and the passenger transport ﬁrm
”7 Juli” in Šabac survived after the intervention of the state. Other ﬁrms like textile producer
”Kluz-Srem” in Ruma or the manufacturing ﬁrm ”Klubara” in Lajkovac were shut down. In these
cases the state had to intervene to provide ﬁnancial aid. An alternative explanation regarding the
higher risks of bankruptcy for large ﬁrms is that big ﬁrms in Serbia were better equipped and had
largely immobile assets. As a result, they constituted a more attractive target for asset-stripping.
Judging from EBRD transition indicators regarding privatisation, the process was moving in
the right direction and showing solid results, although not as eﬃciently as the most advanced
transition countries, for example Estonia (diﬀerent EBRD Transition Reports). On the other
hand, when we look at public support for privatisation, this account is contradicted. According
to Denisova et al. (2012), one of the main sources of public criticism of privatisation comes from
the fact that in transition countries, including Serbia, more than 50% of the population view the
process unfavourably. The reasons for that are that the privatisation is seen as causing illegiti-
mate distribution of wealth, there are concerns about legitimacy of the process and many suﬀer
economic hardships during transition. Additionally, poorly skilled workers oppose privatisation
disproportionately, especially if the institutional environment improves (see Denisova et al., 2009).
All the listed factors contributed to unfavourable public opinion of privatisation in Serbia. Two
explanations have special weight. First, in our sample the direct loss of jobs due to bankruptcy of
privatised ﬁrms was 93 572. With Serbia having one of the highest unemployment rates in Europe
(20.8% in 2014), many of these people could not ﬁnd new jobs, especially those with lower skill
levels. Second, numerous criticisms issuing even from oﬃcial institutions (see Anti-Corruption
Agency, 2015) attacked the legitimacy of the privatisation process and therefore reduced public
support for it.
These facts line up well with our contention that rent-seeking continued under a diﬀerent guise
when privatisation occurred.
7 Conclusion
Our study contributes to understanding the aftermaths of privatisation considering the most broad
sample, free of the ‘survivorship bias’, and addressing the Kikeri and Nellis (2004) critique. Our
ﬁndings conﬁrm the need to study the design of privatisation processes in order to understand
success (or failure). We found that rent-seeking bureaucrats and politicians who held sway in
state-owned enterprises, faced with a credible commitment to privatisation, co-opted the reform
process to maintain their privileged status through asset stripping. We based these results on a
new sample designed to identify the types of owners of privatised ﬁrms and the fates of these
ﬁrms. Our new data covered 1611 ﬁrms that were privatised after 2001. The evidence showed
that the buyer with political background pursuing asset stripping strategies ampliﬁed the risk of
bankruptcy, which conﬁrmed our ﬁrst hypothesis. Depending on the speciﬁcation, the marginal
11 According to the World Justice Project 2012-2013 Serbia experienced severe problems with corruption and
regulatory enforcement (ranked 18/21 in the region and 74/97 global), and civil justice showed very low rankings
and consequently low values for each element.
12 Between June 2005 and September 2014 nine officials were accused of law violations related to privatisation.
This does not reflect the scale of the problem because, according to the report, the misuses and frauds were system-
atically present and were the result of systematic corruption. Enormous discretionary powers, various loopholes,
and supplementary amendments and conditions made such conduct possible (Anti-Corruption Agency, 2015, p.3).
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eﬀect of politician ownership on the risk of failure ranged from 11.5% to 11.7%. On the whole,
former politicians and bureaucrats were more prone to failure than tycoons. However, they failed
in equal proportion to others before supervision periods ended. In this regard, the survival analysis
conﬁrms that the expiration of the maximum supervision period, captured by the variable end
of supervision, raises the probability of the failure of the ﬁrm signiﬁcantly. The hazard function
for politicians is also higher and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the hazard function of other owners
after the end of supervision. The hazard function for politicians exhibits a rapid increase after
the end of the supervision period. This departure at the end of supervision, in combination with
other rules regarding privatisation, conﬁrms that politicians and bureaucrats involved in formerly
public enterprises co-opted the privatisation process. Faced with a credible commitment to reform,
co-opting the process allowed vested interests to continue extracting rents. The outcome for the
whole of Serbia was disappointing results from an otherwise beneﬁcial process. But, this does
reﬂect the claim of Tullock (2003) that ”people are people” and that politicians are people too.
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Table 6: Baseline results with bootstrapped standard errors, 200 replications
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Variables liquidation ME merger ME bankruptcy ME
Tycoon 0.359 0.0108 1.397*** 0.107** -0.232 -0.0878
(3.267) (0.128) (0.381) (0.0488) (0.263) (0.0613)
Politician 0.303 0.00288 -0.546 -0.0252 0.510** 0.115*
(1.990) (0.0643) (2.267) (0.0513) (0.215) (0.0596)
Disputes prior 1.091 0.0858 -13.99*** -0.0464*** -0.918 -0.176
(7.961) (0.811) (4.439) (0.00858) (6.197) (0.973)
Disputes post 0.104 -0.00607 0.228 -0.00257 0.675*** 0.143***
(1.513) (0.0378) (0.395) (0.0162) (0.171) (0.0433)
Single payment -0.191 -0.00614 0.402 0.0184 -0.00362 -0.00525
(0.361) (0.00999) (0.252) (0.0114) (0.125) (0.0254)
Contract change 0.264 0.0131 -0.170 -0.00316 -0.298** -0.0628**
(0.433) (0.0182) (0.383) (0.0155) (0.142) (0.0288)
LN PINV -0.325*** -0.00777* -0.0724 -0.000119 -0.156*** -0.0278***
(0.0737) (0.00413) (0.0781) (0.00327) (0.0366) (0.00783)
Too big to fail -0.387 -0.0161 -0.816 -0.0337 0.722*** 0.173***
(4.936) (0.0796) (1.143) (0.0211) (0.199) (0.0617)
End of supervision 0.913 -0.0218 -12.03*** -0.0486*** 2.956** 0.534***
(6.936) (0.0721) (1.534) (0.00896) (1.481) (0.119)
Distance 0.00117 -5.12e-06 0.00110 -5.48e-06 0.00318*** 0.000641***
(0.00137) (4.19e-05) (0.00117) (4.83e-05) (0.000646) (0.000128)
Constant 2.341** -1.542 1.656***
(1.175) (1.288) (0.612)
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586
Bootstrapping rounds for errors 200 200 200
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Robustness check with bootstrapped standard errors, 200 replications
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Variables liquidation ME merger ME bankruptcy ME
Tycoon 0.358 0.0107 1.454*** 0.114** -0.251 -0.0919*
(2.190) (0.0859) (0.368) (0.0486) (0.270) (0.0556)
Politician 0.344 0.00409 -0.625 -0.0272 0.529** 0.117**
(1.935) (0.0643) (1.889) (0.0402) (0.222) (0.0577)
Disputes prior 1.270 0.101 -13.94*** -0.0467*** -0.822 -0.164
(8.010) (0.890) (4.739) (0.0115) (6.982) (1.114)
Disputes post 0.132 -0.00598 0.218 -0.00382 0.730*** 0.152***
(0.553) (0.0141) (0.425) (0.0170) (0.178) (0.0374)
Single payment -0.295 -0.00837 0.375 0.0182 -0.0593 -0.0150
(0.334) (0.00937) (0.276) (0.0135) (0.130) (0.0259)
Contract change 0.290 0.0137 -0.151 -0.00282 -0.273* -0.0572*
(0.420) (0.0173) (0.372) (0.0154) (0.144) (0.0299)
LN PINV -0.351*** -0.00855** -0.0833 -0.000563 -0.157*** -0.0271***
(0.0745) (0.00369) (0.0756) (0.00321) (0.0381) (0.00790)
Too big to fail -0.447 -0.0162 -0.843 -0.0332 0.622*** 0.149***
(4.457) (0.0723) (1.145) (0.0225) (0.200) (0.0546)
End of supervision 0.833 -0.0224 -11.95*** -0.0486*** 2.940*** 0.528***
(7.116) (0.0770) (0.793) (0.0119) (0.501) (0.0787)
Distance 0.00110 -1.73e-06 0.000939 -5.08e-06 0.00277*** 0.000546***
(0.00160) (4.82e-05) (0.00125) (5.13e-05) (0.000641) (0.000124)
Ex-Socialist 1.090 0.0571 -1.095 -0.0314 -0.0623 -0.0239
(3.694) (0.283) (6.820) (0.108) (0.338) (0.133)
Offshore -12.98*** -0.0320** 0.948 0.0648 -0.0424 -0.0195
(0.865) (0.0135) (3.906) (0.360) (0.477) (0.157)
Mining and Construction -0.549 -0.0171 -0.430 -0.0204 0.375** 0.0914***
(0.526) (0.0123) (0.396) (0.0131) (0.156) (0.0335)
Manufacturing 0.220 -0.00267 0.0961 -0.00804 0.712*** 0.148***
(0.342) (0.0101) (0.307) (0.0124) (0.132) (0.0273)
Constant 2.790** -1.292 1.466**
(1.153) (1.268) (0.643)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577
Bootstrapping rounds for errors 200 200 200
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 
 
The Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences continues since 2015 the established “FZID Discussion 
Paper Series” of the “Centre for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID)” under the name “Hohenheim 
Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences”.  
 
Institutes 
 
510 Institute of Financial Management 
520 Institute of Economics 
530 Institute of Health Care & Public Management 
540 Institute of Communication Science 
550 Institute of Law and Social Sciences 
560 Institute of Economic and Business Education 
570 Institute of Marketing & Management 
580 Institute of Interorganisational Management & Performance 
 
Download Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences  
from our homepage:  https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/papers 
 
 
 
 
Nr.         Autor     Titel               Inst. 
    
01-2015 Thomas Beissinger, 
Philipp Baudy 
THE IMPACT OF TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK  
ON TRADE UNION WAGE SETTING: 
A Theoretical Analysis 
 
520 
02-2015 Fabian Wahl 
 
PARTICIPATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND  
CITY DEVELOPMENT 800-1800 
 
520 
03-2015 Tommaso Proietti, 
Martyna Marczak, 
Gianluigi Mazzi 
 
EUROMIND-D: A DENSITY ESTIMATE OF  
MONTHLY GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR  
THE EURO AREA 
520 
04-2015 Thomas Beissinger, 
Nathalie Chusseau, 
Joël Hellier 
 
OFFSHORING AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: 
MODELLING THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
520 
05-2015 Matthias Mueller, 
Kristina Bogner, 
Tobias Buchmann, 
Muhamed Kudic 
 
SIMULATING KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION IN FOUR 
STRUCTURALLY DISTINCT NETWORKS  
– AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
520 
06-2015 Martyna Marczak, 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
BIDIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND EXCESS RETURNS: 
NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE WAVELET PERSPECTIVE 
 
520 
07-2015 Peng Nie, 
Galit Nimrod, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
INTERNET USE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING  
IN CHINA 
530 
08-2015 Fabian Wahl  
 
THE LONG SHADOW OF HISTORY 
ROMAN LEGACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
– EVIDENCE FROM THE GERMAN LIMES 
 
520 
09-2015 Peng Nie,  
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
COMMUTE TIME AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN 
URBAN CHINA 
530 
Nr.         Autor     Titel               Inst. 
    
10-2015 Kristina Bogner 
 
THE EFFECT OF PROJECT FUNDING ON 
INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE  
AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
 
520 
 
11-2015 Bogang Jun, 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
ANALYTICAL MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK:  
THE EXPANDED REPRODUCTION SYSTEM 
 
520 
12-2015 Volker Grossmann 
Aderonke Osikominu 
Marius Osterfeld 
 
ARE SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR 
STUDYING A SCIENCE UNIVERSITY MAJOR? 
520 
 
13-2015 Martyna Marczak 
Tommaso Proietti 
Stefano Grassi 
A DATA–CLEANING AUGMENTED KALMAN FILTER 
FOR ROBUST ESTIMATION OF STATE SPACE 
MODELS 
 
520 
14-2015 Carolina Castagnetti 
Luisa Rosti 
Marina Töpfer 
 
THE REVERSAL OF THE GENDER PAY GAP AMONG 
PUBLIC-CONTEST SELECTED YOUNG EMPLOYEES 
520 
15-2015 Alexander Opitz DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA: 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 AND THE POLITICAL 
STOCK MARKET 
 
520 
01-2016 Michael Ahlheim,  
Jan Neidhardt 
NON-TRADING BEHAVIOUR IN CHOICE 
EXPERIMENTS 
 
520 
02-2016 Bogang Jun,  
Alexander Gerybadze, 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
THE LEGACY OF FRIEDRICH LIST: THE EXPANSIVE 
REPRODUCTION SYSTEM AND THE KOREAN 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
520 
03-2016 Peng Nie,  
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
FOOD INSECURITY AMONG OLDER EUROPEANS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF HEALTH, AGEING, 
AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE 
 
530 
04-2016 Peter Spahn POPULATION GROWTH, SAVING, INTEREST RATES 
AND STAGNATION. DISCUSSING THE EGGERTSSON-
MEHROTRA-MODEL 
 
520 
05-2016 Vincent Dekker, 
Kristina Strohmaier, 
Nicole Bosch 
A DATA-DRIVEN PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE THE 
BUNCHING WINDOW – AN APPLICATION TO THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
520 
06-2016 Philipp Baudy, 
Dario Cords 
DEREGULATION OF TEMPORARY AGENCY 
EMPLOYMENT IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY: DOES 
THIS REALLY LEAD TO A SUBSTITUTION OF 
REGULAR EMPLOYMENT? 
 
520 
07-2016 Robin Jessen,  
Davud Rostam-Afschar, 
Sebastian Schmitz 
 
HOW IMPORTANT IS PRECAUTIONARY LABOR 
SUPPLY? 
520 
08-2016 Peng Nie, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Jianhong Xue 
 
FUEL FOR LIFE: DOMESTIC COOKING FUELS AND 
WOMEN’S HEALTH IN RURAL CHINA 
530 
Nr.         Autor     Titel               Inst. 
    
09-2016 Bogang Jun, 
Seung Kyu-Yi, 
Tobias Buchmann, 
Matthias Müller 
 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
COLLABORATION BETWEEN WEST AND EAST 
GERMANY FROM 1972 TO 2014 
 
520 
10-2016 Vladan Ivanovic, 
Vadim Kufenko, 
Boris Begovic 
Nenad Stanisic, 
Vincent Geloso 
CONTINUITY UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME. 
THE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA 
520 
FZID Discussion Papers 
(published 2009-2014) 
 
Competence Centers 
 
IK   Innovation and Knowledge 
ICT   Information Systems and Communication Systems 
CRFM   Corporate Finance and Risk Management 
HCM   Health Care Management 
CM   Communication Management 
MM   Marketing Management 
ECO  Economics 
  
 
Download FZID Discussion Papers from our homepage: https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/archiv_fzid_papers 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
01-2009 
 
Julian P. Christ 
 
NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY RELOADED: 
Localized Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation 
 
 
IK 
02-2009 André P. Slowak MARKET FIELD STRUCTURE & DYNAMICS IN INDUSTRIAL 
AUTOMATION 
 
IK 
03-2009 Pier Paolo Saviotti, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
GENERALIZED BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
04-2009 Uwe Focht, Andreas 
Richter and Jörg 
Schiller 
 
INTERMEDIATION AND MATCHING IN INSURANCE MARKETS HCM 
05-2009 Julian P. Christ, 
André P. Slowak 
 
WHY BLU-RAY VS. HD-DVD IS NOT VHS VS. BETAMAX: 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
IK 
06-2009 Gabriel Felbermayr, 
Mario Larch and 
Wolfgang Lechthaler 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECO 
07-2009 Steffen Otterbach MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREFERRED WORK 
TIME: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries 
 
HCM 
08-2009 Sven Wydra  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES – ANALYSIS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
IK  
09-2009 Ralf Richter, 
Jochen Streb 
CATCHING-UP AND FALLING BEHIND 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER FROM AMERICAN 
TO GERMAN MACHINE TOOL MAKERS 
IK 
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10-2010 
 
Rahel Aichele, 
Gabriel Felbermayr 
 
 
KYOTO AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF TRADE 
 
ECO 
11-2010 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY IN EUROPE 
 
HCM 
12-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör 
DRINKING AND PROTECTING – A MARKET APPROACH TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF CORK OAK LANDSCAPES 
 
 
ECO 
13-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör,  
Antonia Heinke, 
Nguyen Minh Duc, 
and Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES – HOW GOOD IS IT REALLY? 
ECO 
14-2010 Julian P. Christ  THE GEOGRAPHY AND CO-LOCATION OF EUROPEAN 
TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC CO-INVENTORSHIP NETWORKS 
 
IK 
15-2010 Harald Degner WINDOWS OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY 
DO TECHNOLOGICAL BOOMS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND INNOVATIVENESS? 
 
IK 
16-2010 Tobias A. Jopp THE WELFARE STATE EVOLVES:  
GERMAN KNAPPSCHAFTEN, 1854-1923 
 
HCM 
17-2010 Stefan Kirn (Ed.) PROCESS OF CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS THROUGH 
eHEALTH 
 
ICT 
18-2010 Jörg Schiller ÖKONOMISCHE ASPEKTE DER ENTLOHNUNG  
UND REGULIERUNG UNABHÄNGIGER 
VERSICHERUNGSVERMITTLER  
 
HCM 
19-2010 Frauke Lammers, 
Jörg Schiller  
CONTRACT DESIGN AND INSURANCE FRAUD: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  
 
HCM 
20-2010 Martyna Marczak, 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN GERMANY 
 
ECO 
21-2010 Harald Degner, 
Jochen Streb 
 
FOREIGN PATENTING IN GERMANY, 1877-1932 
 
IK 
22-2010 Heiko Stüber, 
Thomas Beissinger 
DOES DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
DAMPEN WAGE INCREASES? 
 
ECO 
23-2010 Mark Spoerer, 
Jochen Streb 
GUNS AND BUTTER – BUT NO MARGARINE: THE IMPACT OF 
NAZI ECONOMIC POLICIES ON GERMAN FOOD 
CONSUMPTION, 1933-38 
 
ECO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
24-2011 
 
Dhammika 
Dharmapala,  
Nadine Riedel 
 
 
EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
 
    ECO 
25-2011 Michael Schuele, 
Stefan Kirn 
QUALITATIVES, RÄUMLICHES SCHLIEßEN ZUR 
KOLLISIONSERKENNUNG UND KOLLISIONSVERMEIDUNG 
AUTONOMER BDI-AGENTEN  
 
ICT 
26-2011 Marcus Müller, 
Guillaume Stern, 
Ansger Jacob and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT 
27-2011 Monnet Benoit, 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel, 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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